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ABSTRACT
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) are powerful tools in representa-
tion learning for graphs. However, recent studies show that GNNs
are vulnerable to carefully-crafted perturbations, called adversarial
attacks. Adversarial attacks can easily fool GNNs in making predic-
tions for downstream tasks. The vulnerability to adversarial attacks
has raised increasing concerns for applying GNNs in safety-critical
applications. Therefore, developing robust algorithms to defend
adversarial attacks is of great significance. A natural idea to defend
adversarial attacks is to clean the perturbed graph. It is evident
that real-world graphs share some intrinsic properties. For example,
many real-world graphs are low-rank and sparse, and the features of
two adjacent nodes tend to be similar. In fact, we find that adversar-
ial attacks are likely to violate these graph properties. Therefore, in
this paper, we explore these properties to defend adversarial attacks
on graphs. In particular, we propose a general framework Pro-GNN,
which can jointly learn a structural graph and a robust graph neural
network model from the perturbed graph guided by these proper-
ties. Extensive experiments on real-world graphs demonstrate that
the proposed framework achieves significantly better performance
compared with the state-of-the-art defense methods, even when
the graph is heavily perturbed. We release the implementation of
Pro-GNN to our DeepRobust repository for adversarial attacks and
defenses 1. The specific experimental settings to reproduce our re-
sults can be found in https://github.com/ChandlerBang/Pro-GNN.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Graphs are ubiquitous data structures in numerous domains, such as
chemistry (molecules), finance (trading networks) and social media
1https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust
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(the Facebook friend network). With their prevalence, it is particu-
larly important to learn effective representations of graphs and then
apply them to solve downstream tasks. Recent years have witnessed
great success fromGraphNeural Networks (GNNs) [15, 17, 21, 29] in
representation learning of graphs. GNNs follow a message-passing
scheme [14], where the node embedding is obtained by aggregat-
ing and transforming the embeddings of its neighbors. Due to the
good performance, GNNs have been applied to various analytical
tasks including node classification [17], link prediction [18], and
recommender systems [34].
Although promising results have been achieved, recent stud-
ies have shown that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks
[10, 16, 31, 38, 39]. In other words, the performance of GNNs can
greatly degrade under an unnoticeable perturbation in graphs. The
lack of robustness of these models can lead to severe consequences
for critical applications pertaining to the safety and privacy. For
example, in credit card fraud detection, fraudsters can create several
transactions with only a few high-credit users to disguise them-
selves, thus escaping from the detection based on GNNs. Hence,
developing robust GNN models to resist adversarial attacks is of
significant importance. Modifying graph data can perturb either
node features or graph structures. However, given the complexity
of structural information, the majority of existing adversarial at-
tacks on graph data have focused on modifying graph structure
especially adding/deleting/rewiring edges [33]. Thus, in this work,
we aim to defend against the most common setting of adversarial
attacks on graph data, i.e., poisoning adversarial attacks on graph
structure. Under this setting, the graph structure has already been
perturbed by modifying edges before training GNNs while node
features are not changed.
One perspective to design an effective defense algorithm is to
clean the perturbed graph such as removing the adversarial edges
and restoring the deleted edges [27, 37]. The key challenge from this
perspective is what criteria we should follow to clean the perturbed
graph. It is well known that real-world graphs often share certain
properties. First, many real-world clean graphs are low-rank and
sparse [36]. For instance, in a social network, most individuals are
connected with only a small number of neighbors and there are
only a few factors influencing the connections among users [13, 36].
Second, connected nodes in a clean graph are likely to share similar
features or attributes (or feature smoothness) [24]. For example, in
a citation network, two connected publications often share similar
topics [17]. Figure 1 demonstrates these properties of clean and
poisoned graphs. Specifically, we apply the state-of-the-art graph
poisoning attack, metattack [39], to perturb the graph data and
visualize the graph properties before and after mettack. As shown
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Figure 1: An illustrative example on the property changes of the adjacency matrix by adversarial attacks
in Figure 1a,metattack enlarges the singular values of the adjacency
matrix and Figure 1b illustrates that metattack quickly increases
the rank of adjacency matrix. Moreover, when we remove the ad-
versarial and normal edges from the perturbed graph respectively,
we observe that removing adversarial edges reduces the rank faster
than removing normal edges as demonstrated in Figure 1c. In ad-
dition, we depict the density distribution of feature difference of
connected nodes of the attacked graph in Figure 1d. It is observed
that metattack tends to connect nodes with large feature difference.
Observations from Figure 1 indicate that adversarial attacks could
violate these properties. Thus, these properties have the potential
to serve as the guidance to clean the perturbed graph. However,
work of exploring these properties to build robust graph neural
networks is rather limited.
In this paper, we target on exploring graph properties of sparsity,
low rank and feature smoothness to design robust graph neural
networks. Note that there could be more properties to be explored
and we would like to leave it as future work. In essence, we are
faced with two challenges: (i) how to learn clean graph structure
from poisoned graph data guided by these properties; and (ii) how
to jointly learn parameters for robust graph neural network and the
clean structure. To solve these two challenges, we propose a general
framework Property GNN (Pro-GNN) to simultaneously learn the
clean graph structure from perturbed graph and GNN parameters
to defend against adversarial attacks. Extensive experiments on a
variety of real-world graphs demonstrate that our proposed model
can effectively defend against different types of adversarial attacks
and outperforms the state-of-the-art defense methods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we re-
view some of the related work. In Section 3, we introduce notations
and formally define the problem. We explain our proposed frame-
work in Section 4 and report our experimental results in Section 5.
Finally, we conclude the work with future directions in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
In line with the focus of our work, we briefly describe related work
on GNNs, and adversarial attacks and defense for graph data.
2.1 Graph Neural Networks
Over the past few years, graph neural networks have achieved great
success in solving machine learning problems on graph data. To
learn effective representation of graph data, two main families of
GNNs have been proposed, i.e., spectral methods and spatial meth-
ods. The first family learns node representation based on graph
spectral theory [6, 11, 17]. Bruna et al. [6] generalize the convolution
operation from Euclidean data to non-Euclidean data by using the
Fourier basis of a given graph. To simplify spectral GNNs, Deffer-
rard et al. [11] propose ChebNet and utilize Chebyshev polynomials
as the convolution filter. Kipf et al. [17] propose GCN and simplify
ChebNet by using its first-order approximation. Further, Simple
Graph Convolution (SGC) [30] reduces the graph convolution to a
linear model but still achieves competitive performance. The second
family of models define graph convolutions in the spatial domain
as aggregating and transforming local information [14, 15, 29]. For
instance, DCNN [2] treats graph convolutions as a diffusion pro-
cess and assigns a certain transition probability for information
transferred from one node to the adjacent node. Hamilton et al. [15]
propose to learn aggregators by sampling and aggregating neighbor
information. Veličković et al. [29] propose graph attention network
(GAT) to learn different attention scores for neighbors when ag-
gregating information. To further improve the training efficiency,
FastGCN [8] interprets graph convolutions as integral transforms
of embedding functions under probability measures and performs
importance sampling to sample a fixed number of nodes for each
layer. For a thorough review, we please refer the reader to recent
surveys [3, 32, 35].
2.2 Adversarial Attacks and Defense for GNNs
Extensive studies have demonstrated that deep learning models
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. In other words, slight or un-
noticeable perturbations to the input can fool a neural network to
output a wrong prediction. GNNs also suffer this problem [5, 10,
16, 22, 23, 31, 38, 39]. Different from image data, the graph struc-
ture is discrete and the nodes are dependent of each other, thus
making it far more challenging. The nettack [38] generates unnotice-
able perturbations by preserving degree distribution and imposing
constraints on feature co-occurrence. RL-S2V [10] employs rein-
forcement learning to generate adversarial attacks. However, both
of the two methods are designed for targeted attack and can only
degrade the performance of GNN on target nodes. To perturb the
graph globally, metattack [39] is proposed to generate poisoning
attacks based on meta-learning. Although increasing efforts have
been devoted to developing adversarial attacks on graph data, the
research about improving the robustness of GNNs has just started
recently [27, 31, 37, 40]. One way to solve the problem is to learn
a robust network by penalizing the attention scores of adversarial
edges. RGCN [37] is to model Gaussian distributions as hidden
layers to absorb the effects of adversarial attacks in the variances.
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PA-GNN [27] leverages supervision knowledge from clean graphs
and applies a meta-optimization way to learn attention scores for ro-
bust graph neural networks. However, it requires additional graph
data from similar domain. The other way is to preprocess the per-
turbed graphs to get clean graphs and train GNNs on the clean
ones. Wu et. al [31] have found that attackers tend to connect to
nodes with different features and they propose to remove the links
between dissimilar nodes. Entezari et al. [12] have observed that
nettack results in changes in high-rank spectrum of the graph and
propose to preprocess the graph with its low-rank approximations.
However, due to the simplicity of two-stage preprocessing methods,
they may fail to counteract complex global attacks.
Different from the aforementioned defense methods, we aim
to explore important graph properties to recover the clean graph
while learning the GNN parameters simultaneously, which enables
the proposed model to extract intrinsic structure from perturbed
graph under different attacks.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
Before we present the problem statement, we first introduce some
notations and basic concepts. The Frobenius norm of a matrix S
is defined by | |S| |2F = Σi jS2i j . The ℓ1 norm of a matrix S is given
by | |S| |1 = Σi j |Si j | and the nuclear norm of a matrix S is defined
as | |S| |∗ = Σrank (S)i=1 σi , where σi is the i-th singular value of S.(S)+ denotes the element-wise positive part of matrix S where
Si j = max{Si j , 0} and sдn(S) indicates the sign matrix of S where
sдn(S)i j = 1, 0, or −1 if Si j >0, =0, or <0, respectively. We use ⊙
to denote Hadamard product of matrices. Finally, we use tr (S) to
indicate the trace of matrix S, i.e., tr (S) = ∑i Sii .
Let G = (V, E) be a graph, where V is the set of N nodes
{v1,v2, ...,vN } and E is the set of edges. The edges describe the
relations between nodes and can also be represented by an adja-
cency matrix A ∈ RN×N where Ai j denotes the relation between
nodesvi andvj . Furthermore, we useX = [x1, x2, . . . , xN ] ∈ RN×d
to denote the node feature matrix where xi is the feature vector
of the node vi . Thus a graph can also be denoted as G = (A,X).
Following the common node classification setting, only a part of
nodes VL = {v1,v2, ...,vl } are associated with corresponding la-
bels YL = {y1,y2, ...,yl } where yi denotes the label of vi .
Given a graph G = (A,X) and the partial labels YL , the goal of
node classification for GNN is to learn a function fθ : VL → YL
that maps the nodes to the set of labels so that fθ can predict labels
of unlabeled nodes. The objective function can be formulated as
min
θ
LGNN (θ ,A,X,YL) =
∑
vi ∈VL
ℓ (fθ (X,A)i ,yi ) , (1)
where θ is the parameters of fθ , fθ (X,A)i is the prediction of node
vi and ℓ(·, ·) is to measure the difference between prediction and
true label such as cross entropy. Though there exist a number of
different GNN methods, in this work, we focus on Graph Convo-
lution Network (GCN) in [17]. Note that it is straightforward to
extend the proposed framework to other GNN models. Specifically,
a two-layer GCN with θ = (W1,W2) implements fθ as
fθ (X,A) = softmax
(
Aˆ σ
(
Aˆ XW1
)
W2
)
, (2)
Update GNN Parameters 𝜃"#$ = 𝜃" − 𝜂	∇*+ℒ-..
Low-rank and Sparsity
Feature Smoothness
Poisoned Graph Update Structure
Clean Graph
Parameters 𝜽∗
Figure 2: Overall framework of Pro-GNN. Dash lines indi-
cate smaller weights.
where Aˆ = D˜−1/2(A+ I)D˜−1/2 and D˜ is the diagonal matrix of A+ I
with D˜ii = 1 +
∑
j Ai j . σ is the activation function such as ReLU.
With aforementioned notations and definitions, the problem we
aim to study in this work can be formally stated as:
GivenG = {A,X} and partial node labelVL withA being poisoned
by adversarial edges and feature matrix X unperturbed, simultane-
ously learn a clean graph structure with the graph adjacency matrix
S ∈ S = [0, 1]N×N and the GNN parameters θ to improve node
classification performance for unlabeled nodes.
4 THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Adversarial attacks generate carefully-crafted perturbation on graph
data. We refer to the carefully-crafted perturbation as adversarial
structure. Adversarial structure can cause the performance of GNNs
to drop rapidly. Thus, to defend adversarial attacks, one natural
strategy is to eliminate the crafted adversarial structure, while main-
taining the intrinsic graph structure. In this work, we aim to achieve
the goal by exploring graph structure properties of low rank, spar-
sity and feature smoothness. The illustration of the framework is
shown in Figure 2, where edges in black are normal edges and edges
in red are adversarial edges introduced by an attacker to reduce the
node classification performance. To defend against the attacks, Pro-
GNN iteratively reconstructs the clean graph by preserving the low
rank, sparsity, and feature smoothness properties of a graph so as
to reduce the negative effects of adversarial structure. Meanwhile,
to make sure that the reconstructed graph can help node classifi-
cation, Pro-GNN simultaneously updates the GNN parameters on
the reconstructed graph by solving the optimization problem in an
alternating schema. In the following subsections, we will give the
details of the proposed framework.
4.1 Exploring Low rank and Sparsity Properties
Many real-world graphs are naturally low-rank and sparse as the
entities usually tend to form communities and would only be con-
nected with a small number of neighbors [36]. Adversarial attacks
on GCNs tend to add adversarial edges that link nodes of different
communities as this is more efficient to reduce node classification
performance of GCN. Introducing links connecting nodes of differ-
ent communities in a sparse graph can significantly increase the
rank of the adjacency matrix and enlarge the singular values, thus
damaging the low rank and sparsity properties of graphs, which is
verified in Figure 1a and Figure 1b. Thus, to recover the clean graph
structure from the noisy and perturbed graph, one potential way is
to learn a clean adjacency matrix S close to the adjacency matrix of
the poisoned graph by enforcing the new adjacency matrix with the
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properties of low rank and sparsity. As demonstrated in Figure1c,
the rank decreases much faster by removing adversarial edges than
by removing normal edges. This implies that the low rank and spar-
sity constraint can remove the adversarial edges instead of normal
edges. Given the adjacency matrix A of a poisoned graph, we can
formulate the above process as follows:
argmin
S∈S
L0 = ∥A − S∥2F + R(S), s .t ., S = S⊤. (3)
Since adversarial attacks target on performing unnoticeable per-
turbations to graphs, the first term ∥A − S∥2F ensures that the new
adjacency matrix S should be close to A. As we assume that the
graph are undirected, the new adjacency matrix should be sym-
metric, i.e., S = S⊤. R(S) denotes the constraints on S to enforce
the properties of low rank and sparsity. According to [7, 19, 26],
minimizing the ℓ1 norm and the nuclear norm of a matrix can force
the matrix to be sparse and low-rank, respectively. Hence, to ensure
a sparse and low-rank graph, we want to minimize the ℓ1 norm and
the nuclear norm of S. Eq. (3) can be rewritten as:
argmin
S∈S
L0 = ∥A − S∥2F + α ∥S∥1 + β ∥S∥∗, s .t ., S = S⊤, (4)
where α and β are predefined parameters that control the contri-
butions of the properties of sparsity and low rank, respectively.
One important benefit to minimize the nuclear norm ∥S∥∗ is that
we can reduce every singular value, thus alleviating the impact of
enlarging singular values from adversarial attacks.
4.2 Exploring Feature Smoothness
It is evident that connected nodes in a graph are likely to share
similar features. In fact, this observation has been made on graphs
from numerous domains. For example, two connected users in a
social graph are likely to share similar attributes [24], two linked
web pages in the webpage graph tend to have similar contents [28]
and two connected papers in the citation network usually have
similar topics [17]. Meanwhile, recently it is demonstrated that
adversarial attacks on graphs tend to connect nodes with distinct
features [31]. Thus, we aim to ensure the feature smoothness in
the learned graph. The feature smoothness can be captured by the
following term Ls :
Ls = 12
N∑
i, j=1
Si j (xi − xj )2, (5)
where S is the new adjacency matrix, Si j indicates the connection of
vi and vj in the learned graph and (xi − xj )2 measures the feature
difference between vi and vj . Ls can be rewritten as:
Ls = X⊤LX, (6)
where L = D − S is the graph Laplacian matrix of S and D is the
diagonal matrix of S. In this work, we use normalized Laplacian
matrix Lˆ = D−1/2LD−1/2 instead of L to make feature smoothness
independent on the degrees of the graph nodes [1], i.e.,
Ls = tr (XT LˆX) = 12
d∑
k=1
N∑
i, j=1
Si j ( xi√
di
− xj√
dj
)2, (7)
where di denotes the degree of vi in the learned graph. In the
learned graph, if vi and vj are connected (i.e., Si j , 0), we expect
that the feature difference (xi −xj )2 should be small. In other words,
if the features between two connected node are quite different, Ls
would be very large. Therefore, the smaller Ls is, the smoother
featuresX are on the graph S. Thus, to fulfill the feature smoothness
in the learned graph, we should minimize Ls . Therefore, we can
add the feature smoothness term to the objective function of Eq. (4)
to penalize rapid changes in features between adjacent nodes as:
argmin
S∈S
L = L0 + λ · Ls = L0 + λ tr (XT LˆX), s .t ., S = S⊤, (8)
where λ is a predefined parameter to control the contribution from
feature smoothness.
4.3 Objective Function of Pro-GNN
Intuitively, we can follow the preprocessing strategy [12, 31] to
defend against adversarial attacks – we first learn a graph from
the poisoned graph via Eq. (8) and then train a GNN model based
on the learned graph. However, with such a two-stage strategy,
the learned graph may be suboptimal for the GNN model on the
given task. Thus, we propose a better strategy to jointly learn the
graph structure and the GNN model for a specific downstream
task. We empirically show that jointly learning GNN model and
the adjacency matrix is better than two stage one in Sec 5.4.2. The
final objective function of Pro-GNN is given as
argmin
S∈S,θ
L = L0 + λLs + γLGNN (9)
= ∥A − S∥2F + α ∥S∥1 + β ∥S∥∗ + γLGNN (θ , S,X,YL) + λtr (XT LˆX)
s .t . S = S⊤,
whereLGNN is a loss function for the GNNmodel that is controlled
by a predefined parameter γ . Another benefit of this formulation is
that the information from LGNN can also guide the graph learning
process to defend against adversarial attacks since the goal of graph
adversarial attacks is to maximize LGNN .
4.4 An Optimization Algorithm
Jointly optimizing θ and S in Eq.(9) is challenging. The constraints
on S further exacerbate the difficulty. Thus, in this work, we use an
alternating optimization schema to iteratively update θ and S.
Updateθ .To updateθ , we fix S and remove terms that are irrelevant
to θ , then the objective function in Eq.(9) reduces to:
min
θ
LGNN (θ , S,X,YL) =
∑
u ∈VL
ℓ (fθ (X, S)u ,yu ) , (10)
which is a typical GNN optimization problem and we can learn θ
via stochastic gradient descent.
Update S. Similarly, to update S, we fix θ and arrive at
min
S
L(S,A) + α ∥S∥1 + β ∥S∥∗ s .t ., S = S⊤, S ∈ S, (11)
where L(S,A) is defined as
L(S,A) = ∥A − S∥2F + LGNN (θ , S,X,Y ) + λtr (XT LˆX). (12)
Note that both ℓ1 norm and nuclear norm are non-differentiable.
For optimization problem with only one non-diffiential regularizer,
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Algorithm 1: Pro-GNN
Data: Adjacency matrix A, Attribute matrix X, Labels YL ,
Hyper-parameters α , β ,γ , λ,τ , Learning rate η,η′
Result: Learned adjacency S, GNN parameters θ
1 Initialize S← A
2 Randomly initialize θ
3 while Stopping condition is not met do
4 S← S − η∇S (∥S − A∥2F + γLGNN + λLs )
5 S← proxηβ | |. | |∗ (S)
6 S← proxηα | |. | |1 (S)
7 S← PS(S)
8 for i=1 to τ do
9 д ← ∂LGNN (θ,S,X,YL )
∂θ
10 θ ← θ − η′д
11 Return S,θ
we can use Forward-Backward splitting methods [9]. The idea is to
alternate a gradient descent step and a proximal step as:
S(k )= proxηR
(
S(k−1) − η∇SL(S,A)
)
, (13)
where η is the learning rate, proxR is the proximal operator as:
proxR (Z) = argmin
S∈RN×N
1
2 ∥S − Z| |
2
F + R(S). (14)
In particular, the proximal operator of ℓ1 norm and nuclear norm
can be represented as [4, 26],
proxα | |. | |1 (Z) = sдn(Z) ⊙ (|Z| − α)+, (15)
proxβ | |. | |∗ (Z) = Udiaд((σi − β)+)iVT , (16)
whereZ = Udiaд(σ1, ...,σn )V⊤ is the singular value decomposition
of Z. To optimize objective function with two non-differentiable
regularizers, Richard et al. [25] introduce the Incremental Proximal
Descent method based on the introduced proximal operators. By
iterating the updating process in a cyclic manner, we can update S
as follows, 
S(k ) = S(k−1) − η · ∇S (L(S,A)),
S(k ) = proxηβ ∥ · ∥∗
(
S(k )
)
,
S(k ) = proxηα ∥ · ∥1
(
S(k)
)
.
(17)
After we learn a relaxed S, we project S to satisfy the constraints.
For the symmetric constraint, we let S = S+S⊤2 . For the constraint
Si j ∈ [0, 1], we project Si j < 0 to 0 and Si j > 1 to 1. We denote
these projection operations as PS(S).
Training Algorithm. With these updating and projection rules,
the optimization algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. In line 1, we
first initialize the estimated graph S as the poisoned graphA. In line
2, we randomly initialize the GNN parameters. From lines 3 to 10,
we update S and the GNN parameters θ alternatively and iteratively.
Specifically, we train the GNN parameters in each iteration while
training the graph reconstruction model every τ iterations.
Table 1: Dataset Statistics. Following [12, 38, 39], we only con-
sider the largest connected component (LCC).
NLCC ELCC Classes Features
Cora 2,485 5,069 7 1,433
Citeseer 2,110 3,668 6 3,703
Polblogs 1,222 16,714 2 /
Pubmed 19,717 44,338 3 500
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of Pro-GNN against
different graph adversarial attacks. In particular, we aim to answer
the following questions:
• RQ1 How does Pro-GNN perform compared to the state-of-the-
art defense methods under different adversarial attacks?
• RQ2 Does the learned graph work as expected?
• RQ3How do different properties affect performance of Pro-GNN.
Before presenting our experimental results and observations, we
first introduce the experimental settings.
5.1 Experimental settings
5.1.1 Datasets. Following [38, 39], we validate the proposed ap-
proach on four benchmark datasets, including three citation graphs,
i.e., Cora, Citeseer and Pubmed, and one blog graph, i.e., Polblogs.
The statistics of the datasets are shown in Table 1. Note that in the
Polblogs graph, node features are not available. In this case, we set
the attribute matrix to N × N identity matrix.
5.1.2 Baselines. To evaluate the effectiveness of Pro-GNN, we com-
pare it with the state-of-the-art GNN and defense models by using
the adversarial attack repository DeepRobust [20]:
• GCN [17]: while there exist a number of different Graph Convo-
lutional Networks (GCN) models, we focus on the most represen-
tative one [17].
• GAT [29]: Graph Attention Netowork (GAT) is composed of
attention layers which can learn different weights to different
nodes in the neighborhood. It is often used as a baseline to defend
against adversarial attacks.
• RGCN [37]: RGCN models node representations as gaussian dis-
tributions to absorb effects of adversarial attacks. It also employs
attention mechanism to penalize nodes with high variance.
• GCN-Jaccard [31]: Since attackers tend to connect nodes with
dissimilar features or different labels, GCN-Jaccard preprocesses
the network by eliminating edges that connect nodes with jaccard
similarity of features smaller than threshold τ . Note that this
method only works when node features are available.
• GCN-SVD [12]: This is another preprocessing method to resist
adversarial attacks. It is noted that nettack is a high-rank attack,
thus GCN-SVD proposes to vaccinate GCN with the low-rank
approximation of the perturbed graph. Note that it originally tar-
gets at defending against nettack, however, it is straightforward
to extend it to non-targeted and random attacks.
In addition to representative baselines, we also include one variant
of the proposed framework, Pro-GNN-fs, which is the variant by
eliminating the feature smoothness term (or setting λ = 0).
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Table 2: Node classification performance (Accuracy±Std) under non-targeted attack (metattack ).
Dataset Ptb Rate (%) GCN GAT RGCN GCN-Jaccard2 GCN-SVD Pro-GNN-fs Pro-GNN3
Cora
0 83.50±0.44 83.97±0.65 83.09±0.44 82.05±0.51 80.63±0.45 83.42±0.52 82.98±0.23
5 76.55±0.79 80.44±0.74 77.42±0.39 79.13±0.59 78.39±0.54 82.78±0.39 82.27±0.45
10 70.39±1.28 75.61±0.59 72.22±0.38 75.16±0.76 71.47±0.83 77.91±0.86 79.03±0.59
15 65.10±0.71 69.78±1.28 66.82±0.39 71.03±0.64 66.69±1.18 76.01±1.12 76.40±1.27
20 59.56±2.72 59.94±0.92 59.27±0.37 65.71±0.89 58.94±1.13 68.78±5.84 73.32±1.56
25 47.53±1.96 54.78±0.74 50.51±0.78 60.82±1.08 52.06±1.19 56.54±2.58 69.72±1.69
Citeseer
0 71.96±0.55 73.26±0.83 71.20±0.83 72.10±0.63 70.65±0.32 73.26±0.38 73.28±0.69
5 70.88±0.62 72.89±0.83 70.50±0.43 70.51±0.97 68.84±0.72 73.09±0.34 72.93±0.57
10 67.55±0.89 70.63±0.48 67.71±0.30 69.54±0.56 68.87±0.62 72.43±0.52 72.51±0.75
15 64.52±1.11 69.02±1.09 65.69±0.37 65.95±0.94 63.26±0.96 70.82±0.87 72.03±1.11
20 62.03±3.49 61.04±1.52 62.49±1.22 59.30±1.40 58.55±1.09 66.19±2.38 70.02±2.28
25 56.94±2.09 61.85±1.12 55.35±0.66 59.89±1.47 57.18±1.87 66.40±2.57 68.95±2.78
Polblogs
0 95.69±0.38 95.35±0.20 95.22±0.14 - 95.31±0.18 93.20±0.64 -
5 73.07±0.80 83.69±1.45 74.34±0.19 - 89.09±0.22 93.29±0.18 -
10 70.72±1.13 76.32±0.85 71.04±0.34 - 81.24±0.49 89.42±1.09 -
15 64.96±1.91 68.80±1.14 67.28±0.38 - 68.10±3.73 86.04±2.21 -
20 51.27±1.23 51.50±1.63 59.89±0.34 - 57.33±3.15 79.56±5.68 -
25 49.23±1.36 51.19±1.49 56.02±0.56 - 48.66±9.93 63.18±4.40 -
Pubmed
0 87.19±0.09 83.73±0.40 86.16±0.18 87.06±0.06 83.44±0.21 87.33±0.18 87.26±0.23
5 83.09±0.13 78.00±0.44 81.08±0.20 86.39±0.06 83.41±0.15 87.25±0.09 87.23±0.13
10 81.21±0.09 74.93±0.38 77.51±0.27 85.70±0.07 83.27±0.21 87.25±0.09 87.21±0.13
15 78.66±0.12 71.13±0.51 73.91±0.25 84.76±0.08 83.10±0.18 87.20±0.09 87.20±0.15
20 77.35±0.19 68.21±0.96 71.18±0.31 83.88±0.05 83.01±0.22 87.09±0.10 87.15±0.15
25 75.50±0.17 65.41±0.77 67.95±0.15 83.66±0.06 82.72±0.18 86.71±0.09 86.76±0.19
1 2 JaccardGCN and Pro-GNN cannot be directly applied to datasets where node features are not available.
5.1.3 Parameter Settings. For each graph, we randomly choose
10% of nodes for training, 10% of nodes for validation and the re-
maining 80% of nodes for testing. For each experiment, we report
the average performance of 10 runs. The hyper-parameters of all
the models are tuned based on the loss and accuracy on validation
set. For GCN and GAT, we adopt the default parameter setting
in the author’s implementation. For RGCN, the number of hid-
den units are tuned from {16, 32, 64, 128}. For GCN-Jaccard, the
threshold of similarity for removing dissimilar edges is chosen from
{0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.1}. For GCN-SVD , the reduced rank
of the perturbed graph is tuned from {5, 10, 15, 50, 100, 200}.
5.2 Defense Performance
To answer the first question, we evaluate the node classification
performance of Pro-GNN against three types of attacks, i.e., non-
targeted attack, targeted attack and random attack:
• Targeted Attack: Targeted attack generates attacks on specific
nodes and aims to fool GNNs on these target nodes. We adopt
nettack [38] for the targeted attack method, which is the state-
of-the-art targeted attack on graph data.
• Non-targeted Attack: Different from targeted attack, the goal
of non-targeted attack is to degrade the overall performance of
GNNs on the whole graph. We adopt one representative non-
targeted attack, metattack [39] .
• Random Attack: It randomly injects fake edges into the graph.
It can also be viewed as adding random noise to the clean graph.
We first use the attack method to poison the graph. We then
train Pro-GNN and baselines on the poisoned graph and evaluate
the node classification performance achieved by these methods.
5.2.1 Against Non-targeted Adversarial Attacks. We first evaluate
the node classification accuracy of different methods against non-
targeted adversarial attack. Specifically, we adopt metattack and
keep all the default parameter settings in the authors’ original im-
plementation. Themetattack has several variants. For Cora, Citeseer
and Polblogs datasets, we apply Meta-Self since it is the most de-
structive attack variant; while for Pubmed, the approximate version
of Meta-Self, A-Meta-Self is applied to save memory and time. We
vary the perturbation rate, i.e., the ratio of changed edges, from 0
to 25% with a step of 5%. As mentioned before, all the experiments
are conducted 10 times and we report the average accuracy with
standard deviation in Table 2. The best performance is highlighted
in bold. From the table, we make the following observations:
• Our method consistently outperforms other methods under dif-
ferent perturbation rates. For instance, on Polblogs dataset our
model improves GCN over 20% at 5% perturbation rate. Even un-
der large perturbation, our method outperforms other baselines
by a larger margin. Specifically, under the 25% perturbation rate
on the three datasets, vanilla GCN performs very poorly and our
model improves GCN by 22%, 12% and 14%, respectively.
• Although GCN-SVD also employs SVD to get low-rank approxi-
mation of the graph, the performance of GCN-SVD drops rapidly.
This is because GCN-SVD is designed for targeted attack, it can-
not adapt well to the non-targeted adversarial attack. Similarly,
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Figure 3: Results of different models under nettack
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Figure 4: Results of different models under random attack
GCN-Jaccard does not perform as well as Pro-GNN under differ-
ent perturbation rates. This is because simply preprocessing the
perturbed graph once cannot recover the complex intrinsic graph
structure from the carefully-crafted adversarial noises. On the
contrary, simultaneously updating the graph structure and GNN
parameters with the low rank, sparsity and feature smoothness
constraints helps recover better graph structure and learn robust
GNN parameters.
• Pro-GNN achieves higher accuracy than Pro-GNN-fs especially
when the perturbation rate is large, which demonstrates the
effectiveness of feature smoothing in removing adversarial edges.
5.2.2 Against Targeted Adversarial Attack. In this experiment, net-
tack is adopted as the targeted-attack method and we use the default
parameter settings in the authors’ original implementation. Fol-
lowing [37], we vary the number of perturbations made on every
targeted node from 1 to 5 with a step size of 1. The nodes in test
set with degree larger than 10 are set as target nodes. For Pubmed
dataset, we only sample 10% of them to reduce the running time
of nettack while in other datasets we use all the target nodes. The
node classification accuracy on target nodes is shown in Figure 3.
From the figure, we can observe that when the number of perturba-
tion increases, the performance of our method is better than other
methods on the attacked target nodes in most cases. For instance,
on Citeseer dataset at 5 perturbation per targeted node, our model
improves vanilla GCN by 23% and outperforms other defense meth-
ods by 11%. It demonstrates that our method can also resist the
targeted adversarial attack.
5.2.3 Against Random Attack. In this subsection, we evaluate how
Pro-GNN behaves under different ratios of random noises from 0%
to 100% with a step size of 20%. The results are reported in Figure 4.
The figure shows that Pro-GNN consistently outperforms all other
baselines and successfully resists random attack. Together with
observations from Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, we can conclude that
Pro-GNN is able to defend various types of adversarial attacks. This
is a desired property in practice since attackers can adopt any kinds
of attacks to fool the system.
5.3 Importance of Graph Structure Learning
In the previous subsection, we have demonstrated the effectiveness
of the proposed framework. In this section, we aim to understand
the graph we learned and answer the second question.
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Figure 5: Weight density distributions of normal and adver-
sarial edges on the learned graph.
5.3.1 Normal Edges Against Adversarial Edges. Based on the fact
that adversary tends to add edges over delete edges [31, 39], if the
model tends to learn a clean graph structure, the impact of the
adversarial edges should be mitigated from the poisoned graph.
Thus, we investigate the weights of normal and adversarial edges
in the learned adjacency matrix S. We visualize the weight density
distribution of normal and perturbed edges of S in Figure 5. Due to
the limit of space, we only show results on Pubmed and Polblogs
under metattack. As we can see in the figure, in both datasets,
the weights of adversarial edges are much smaller than those of
normal edges, which shows that Pro-GNN can alleviate the effect
of adversarial edges and thus learn robust GNN parameters.
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Table 3: Node classification accuracy given the graph under
25% perturbation bymetattack.
GCN GCN-NoGraph Pro-GNN
Cora 47.53±1.96 62.12±1.55 69.72±1.69
Citeseer 56.94±2.09 63.75±3.23 68.95±2.78
Polblogs 49.23±1.36 51.79±0.62 63.18±4.40
Pubmed 75.50±0.17 84.14±0.11 86.86±0.19
5.3.2 Performance on Heavily Poisoned Graph. In this subsection,
we study the performance when the graph is heavily poisoned. In
particular, we poison the graph with 25% perturbation bymetattack .
If a graph is heavily poisoned, the performance of GCNwill degrade
a lot. One straightforward solution is to remove the poisoned graph
structure. Specifically, when removing the graph structure, the
adjacency matrix will be all zeros and GCN normalizes the zero
matrix into identity matrix and then makes prediction totally by
node features. Under this circumstance, GCN actually becomes
a feed-forward neural network. We denote it as GCN-NoGraph.
We report the performance of GCN, GCN-NoGraph and Pro-GNN
when the graph is heavily poisoned in Table 3.
From the table, we first observe that when the graph structure is
heavily poisoned, by removing the graph structure, GCN-NoGraph
outperforms GCN. This observation suggests the necessity to de-
fend poisoning attacks on graphs because the poisoned graph struc-
ture are useless or even hurt the prediction performance. We also
note that Pro-GNN obtains much better results than GCN-NoGraph.
This observation suggests that Pro-GNN can learn useful graph
structural information even when the graph is heavily poisoned.
5.4 Ablation Study
To get a better understanding of how different components help
our model defend against adversarial attacks, we conduct ablation
studies and answer the third question in this subsection.
5.4.1 Regularizers. There are four key predefined parameters, i.e.,
α , β , γ and λ, which control the contributions for sparsity, low rank,
GNN loss and feature smoothness, respectively. To understand the
impact of each component, we vary the values of one parameter and
set other parameters to zero, and then check how the performance
changes. Correspondingly, four model variants are created: Pro-
GNN-α , Pro-GNN-β , Pro-GNN-γ and Pro-GNN-λ. For example,
Pro-GNN-α denotes that we vary the values of α while setting β , γ
and λ to zero. We only report results on Cora and Citeseer, since
similar patterns are observed in other cases, shown in Figure 6.
From the figure we can see Pro-GNN-α does not boost the
model’s performance too much with small perturbations. But when
the perturbation becomes large, Pro-GNN-α outperforms vanilla
GCN because it can learn a graph structure better than a heavily
poisoned adjacency graph as shown in Section 5.3.2. Also, Pro-
GNN-β and Pro-GNN-λ perform much better than vanilla GCN. It
is worth noting that, Pro-GNN-β outperforms all other variants
except Pro-GNN, indicating that nuclear norm is of great signif-
icance in reducing the impact of adversarial attacks. It is in line
with our observation that adversarial attacks increase the rank of
the graph and enlarge the singular values. Another observation
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Figure 6: Classification performance of Pro-GNN variants.
from the figure is that, Pro-GNN-γ works better under small pertur-
bation and when the perturbation rate increases, its performance
degrades. From the above observations, different components play
different roles in defending adversarial attacks. By incorporating
these components, Pro-GNN can explore the graph properties and
thus consistently outperform state-of-the-art baselines.
5.4.2 Two-Stage vs One-Stage. To study the contribution of jointly
learning structure and GNN parameters, we conduct experiments
with the variant Pro-GNN-two under metattack . Pro-GNN-two is
the two stage variant of Pro-GNN where we first obtain the clean
graph and then train a GNN model based on it. We only show
the results on Cora in Table 4 due to the page limitation. We can
observe from the results that although Pro-GNN-two can achieve
good performance under large perturbation, it fails to defend the
attacks when the perturbation rate is relatively low. The results
demonstrate that jointly learning structure and GNN parameters
can actually help defend attacks.
5.5 Parameter Analysis
In this subsection, we explore the sensitivity of hyper-parameters
α , β ,γ and λ for Pro-GNN. In the experiments, we alter the value of
α , β ,γ and λ to see how they affect the performance of our model.
More specifically, we vary α from 0.00025 to 0.064 in a log scale
of base 2, β from 0 to 5, γ from 0.0625 to 16 in a log scale of base
2 and λ from 1.25 to 320 in a log scale of base 2. We only report
the results on Cora dataset with the perturbation rate of 10% by
metattack since similar observations are made in other settings.
The performance change of Pro-GNN is illustrated in Figure 7. As
we can see, the accuracy of Pro-GNN can be boosted when choosing
appropriate values for all the hyper-parameters. Different from γ ,
appropriate values of α and λ can boost the performance but large
valueswill greatly hurt the performance. This is because focusing on
sparsity and feature smoothness will result in inaccurate estimation
on the graph structure. For example, if we set α and λ to +∞, we
will get a trivial solution of the new adjacency matrix, i.e, S = 0. It
is worth noting that, appropriate value of β can greatly increase the
model’s performance (more than 10%) compared with the variant
without β , while too large or too small value of β will hurt the
performance. This is also consistent with our observation in Section
5.4.1 that the low rank property plays an important role in defending
adversarial attacks.
6 CONCLUSION
Graph neural networks can be easily fooled by graph adversar-
ial attacks. To defend against different types of graph adversarial
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Table 4: Classification performance of Pro-GNN-two and Pro-GNN on Cora dataset
Ptb Rate (%) 0 5 10 15 20 25
Pro-GNN-two 73.31±0.71 73.70±1.02 73.69±0.81 75.38±1.10 73.22±1.08 70.57±0.61
Pro-GNN 82.98±0.23 82.27±0.45 79.03±0.59 76.40±1.27 73.32±1.56 69.72±1.69
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Figure 7: Results of parameter analysis on Cora dataset
attacks, we introduced a novel defense approach Pro-GNN that
learns the graph structure and the GNN parameters simultaneously.
Our experiments show that our model consistently outperforms
state-of-the-art baselines and improves the overall robustness un-
der various adversarial attacks. In the future, we aim to explore
more properties to further improve the robustness of GNNs.
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